Ecological Transition: Economic, Social, and Political Factors That Are Still Too Often Overlooked

You are a faculty member and researcher at Mines Paris – PSL: How long have you been there, and what is your area of expertise?

I joined Mines Paris – PSL in 2011 after five years of study and work in the United Kingdom. There, I held positions of increasing responsibility: first on a tenure track, then as a research fellow. I have been a research director since 2025. At the PERSEE center, my work focuses on the impact of the environment on energy infrastructure, as well as on the application of forecasts to decision-making in this field.

You also coordinate the Specialized Master’s in Renewable Energy (MS ENR). What does this role entail, as opposed to direct teaching?

I began working on this Specialized Master’s program when I arrived at the School, before taking on pedagogical responsibility for it in 2018. My role consists primarily of ensuring that the program aligns with industry needs and regulatory requirements, in coordination with the eight other European partner universities and research centers involved in the program.

It also involves overseeing every phase of the program: from selecting instructors to organizing and grading exams, all the way through to the graduation ceremony. This work is meaningful in two ways: it contributes to the energy transition and to improving our planet and society, while also enabling students to effectively accelerate or reorient their careers.

What are the main focuses of the program, and what added value does it bring to both students and the industry?

The MS ENR is part of a broader program, theEuropean Master in Renewable Energies, organized since 2002 by Mines Paris – PSL and several other partner universities and research centers, under the coordination of the EUREC association.

In the first semester, students take a general course on renewable energy. In the second semester, they develop expertise in a specific technology: wind power, photovoltaics, marine energy, concentrated solar power, sustainable fuels, or grid integration and energy digitization. The third semester is spent in a corporate setting.

Courses are taught in French and English in two different countries, fostering true operational bilingualism. The goal is to train experts capable of mastering a specific technology, advancing within this industry throughout their careers, and easily leading international projects, both in France and abroad. Beyond technical training, bilingualism, and international mobility, the students’ strong motivation is itself a unique asset for companies in the sector.

Renewable energy is generally presented as an environmental obligation—something we “pay” for the sake of the planet. What are your thoughts on this?

This view is too narrow. Climate change is currently the main driver of the transition in the eyes of the general public, but presenting it solely as an environmental cost obscures three other categories of benefits: economic, social, and political.

This is not a new idea, by the way. Modern research and policy on renewable energy took off in the 1970s, not primarily for climate reasons—which were not yet part of the public debate—but in response to the 1973 oil crisis and the concerns it raised about energy security and the cost of energy. The environmental argument gained strength later on; the economic and sovereignty-related arguments were already present.

In short, beyond reducing emissions, the transition brings about stronger national economic growth through import substitution, local production, and local construction. It also creates jobs related to installation and maintenance activities that are difficult to offshoring, as well as political stability resulting from energy sovereignty and reduced vulnerability to external price shocks.

This, in essence, is the common conclusion reached by two influential thinkers, albeit driven by different motivations: the American Amory Lovins and the German Hermann Scheer. Both believe that renewable energy and energy efficiency are competitive from a purely economic standpoint, as they are less costly and faster to implement, even though they disagree on whether market forces alone are sufficient to bring about the transition or whether it is necessary to resort to policy measures in the form of incentives.

Specifically, how can producing more energy within a given territory and consuming it there generate economic benefits?

Let us clarify from the outset that we are referring here to production within a given area, state, region, or department, and not to self-production and self-consumption at the household level, which have a different scope and dynamics.

GDP is the sum of consumption, investment, government spending, and the trade balance (i.e., exports minus imports). With the same level of spending and for the same energy service, energy transition technologies shift the allocation of these expenditures: imports of fossil fuels, which weigh on net exports, are replaced by domestic investments and domestic operating expenses, thereby increasing GDP even without an overall increase in spending.

This mechanism works because the underlying need we are addressing is a service—heating, transportation, electricity—rather than the use of a specific fuel. A heat pump or an electric vehicle provides this service while replacing imported oil or gas with domestically generated electricity and locally installed equipment.

The extent of the GDP improvement depends on the share of spending on construction, manufacturing, fuel, and maintenance that remains in the local economy, as opposed to the share that flows abroad. In practice, this varies considerably depending on the technology and supply chain choices: domestic manufacturing versus global sourcing.

Local manufacturing—such as the assembly of batteries or solar panels—adds specific value unique to each technology. This effect is most pronounced in the solar energy sector: the shift from imported equipment to locally manufactured equipment can significantly increase the capture of national value.

This has policy implications: since it is the share of value generated within the country—and not simply total expenditures—that determines GDP, an industrial policy aimed at localizing specific, cost-intensive phases has a disproportionate effect on wealth retention.

What kinds of jobs are we talking about? Can they withstand automation or offshoring?

Two categories are particularly resistant to offshoring: installation and maintenance. By their very nature, these activities are tied to a specific location: a technician specializing in heat pumps, a solar panel installer, or a power plant operator must be physically present where the equipment is located. These professions span various skill levels, ranging from installation trades to electrical engineering, including project financing, as well as legal aspects and permitting procedures.

Jobs related to the industrial supply chain—extraction, materials processing, recycling, and component manufacturing—are now more vulnerable to offshoring. Most solar panels, for example, are imported, but the domestic share can be increased through a localization policy. It should also be noted that not all of these jobs create added value: some replace jobs in fossil fuel-related activities that they supplant, rather than contributing to them.

These jobs may also be resilient to new threats posed by automation and replacement by AI. Labor intensity in the areas of installation and maintenance is a structural characteristic. These activities require a human presence, regardless of the degree of automation achieved upstream in manufacturing, making them a plausible retraining option for workers displaced elsewhere, provided that reskilling pathways exist.

Beyond the economic aspects, how does the energy transition affect a country’s stability and independence?

Energy sovereignty is one of its main political benefits. Domestic renewable energy production and efficiency gains reduce vulnerability to price shocks and issues with the availability of imported fuels.

However, these shocks are not limited to energy bills: they ripple out in the form of inflation and disruptions throughout value chains, far beyond the energy sector itself, affecting in particular construction, food, and transportation, which weakens the productive fabric as a whole as well as social cohesion. Furthermore, this vulnerability has often been used as a weapon to exert political pressure, as during the oil crisis of the 1970s or during the invasion of Ukraine. Local renewable energy capacity and the resulting jobs, shielded from these external repercussions, play a stabilizing role.

There is a secondary benefit at the regional level: an increase in property values. Roofs, parking lots, and marginal or low-yield farmland—which previously generated no income—become revenue-generating assets once equipped with renewable energy installations, simply because existing renewable resources—wind, sun, rain, and geothermal heat—become economically viable thanks to new technologies. This is particularly important in rural and economically peripheral regions, where land is often the primary available asset. A new financial flow thus emerges, unrelated to agricultural production, thereby strengthening the economic weight of these regions and giving them a more significant role in the national economy.

Who actually benefits from these gains: households, businesses, local governments, or farmers?

All four of these stakeholders benefit, in different but simultaneous ways. Households enjoy cheaper, more reliable, and locally produced energy: heat pumps and electric vehicles reduce fuel bills—which depend on imports—while running on domestically generated electricity. Businesses enjoy the same benefits in terms of price and reliability, as well as new investment opportunities, ranging from project financing to manufacturing within the supply chain. Local governments benefit from tax revenue, local economic development, and job creation linked to the construction and operation of facilities, all while reducing local pollution. Farmers gain a particular advantage: leasing marginal or low-yield land for the installation of renewable energy parks generates income independent of crop yields or commodity prices, while on-site electricity production directly powers irrigation, drying, and other agricultural operations, thereby reducing input costs.

Are France or Europe ready to establish this entire value chain, from raw materials to financing?

Not yet, and that is precisely where the opportunity lies. France and Europe are already well-positioned in the fields of construction, operations and maintenance, engineering, and finance—all of which are inherently local activities that are difficult to offshoring. They are, however, relatively weak in the sectors of extraction, materials processing, and certain segments of the manufacturing industry, or have offshored certain activities. These sectors can be redeveloped at the national level or, more realistically, on a European scale, where supply chains, capital markets, and the end market reach sufficient size.

Other regions are rapidly moving in the same direction: China and India are among the major economies undergoing the fastest electrification, even though they still rely largely on coal today. Developing countries have even more to gain proportionally, since developing local renewable energy capacity allows them to keep their wealth within their borders, reduce pollution, and lessen their dependence on foreign energy suppliers, rather than replicating the model of dependence on imports.

Relocating the most vulnerable segments of the value chain is therefore not a defensive measure, but a way to capitalize on an advantage that every region has an interest in pursuing.

The energy transition is projected to be completed by 2050. Why can’t it wait?

Because delay is not neutral: it results in financial losses and instability, not just a slowdown in progress. The best time to accelerate the transition was ten years ago, then nine, then yesterday. Waiting does not preserve options: it increases the annual bill for fossil fuel imports, delays the creation of domestic jobs, and pushes back the point at which energy sovereignty will begin to protect the country from external shocks. The obstacles are rarely technical or economic; they are institutional: outdated regulations, hesitant financing, and fragmented policies.

Today, the best option remains to act now: for households, this could mean installing a heat pump—which also provides relief during heat waves and improves thermal comfort as well as property value—or purchasing an electric vehicle; and, more broadly, it means raising awareness among the general public, businesses, and policymakers regarding the needs and benefits of the energy transition.

Viewed from this perspective, the energy transition is not an expense for the sake of the planet. It is an investment whose benefits—in terms of jobs, GDP, and sovereignty—diminish with every year that decisions are postponed.